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 Abstract 
 
Blockchain technology is rapidly growing and can in the near future disrupt industries such as 
finance, cyber security, and political voting systems. The interest in the phenomenon has increased the 
past years, and as a result, more research within the field has emerged as a natural outcome. Previous 
research has to a large extent focused on technical and legal issues facing the technology. In contrast, 
this study aims to fill the research gap by bringing insight to the field of governance within public 
blockchain open source software (OSS) communities, whereas the most well-recognized blockchain 
projects, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum are OSS. Therefore, the following research question has been 
set to direct this study; Which governance mechanisms are expressed within public blockchain 
communities? By analyzing previous research on governance mechanisms within OSS, a theoretical 
framework was constructed. The framework was based on well-recognized OSS community literature 
and consists of six governance mechanisms. The similarities and differences between OSS 
communities and blockchain OSS communities are identified through the use of the theoretical 
framework. Moreover, by analyzing forum and blog posts on online communities where contributors 
communicate regarding development and visions of the researched community and platform. On those 
communities, by-products from communications has been left as digital traces, which is analyzed by 
conducting a methodology referred to as trace ethnography. Furthermore, an exploratory approach 
was included in this study, allowing the researchers to explore beyond the scope of the framework. 
The framework was used as a foundation for this study, and resulted in findings showing that several 
governance mechanisms are similar to those in OSS communities, whilst others differed. Five of the 
mechanisms were found to be similar to those in the framework. However, the sixth mechanism 
involving leadership differed from OSS communities since the community decide which road to 
follow. This does not make it autocratic, or democratic, since the contributors have an option to 
support the version of protocol they believe will prevail. Lastly, initiative-based progress is presented 
as an extended mechanism, and an implication from this study. This is due to it instigating a flexible 
and progressive approach towards rapidly developing a collaborative project within blockchain OSS 
communities. 
Keywords: OSS communities, community governance, blockchain technology, blockchain governance, 
governance mechanisms 
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Introduction 
In the last few years, interest of blockchain technologies and cryptocurrencies has grown 
exponentially, which has resulted in more studies and an increased appeal in the phenomenon (Kiffer, 
Levin & Mislove 2017; Chakrabarti & Chaudhuri 2017; Yli-Huumo, Ko, Choi, Park & Smolander 
2016; Porru, Pinna, Marchesi & Tonelli 2017). The starting point of blockchain-related projects took 
place during 2009, when an anonymous individual or group of developers presented Bitcoin, and got 
support from early adopters because of it being a decentralized system (Böhme, Christin, Edelman & 
Moore 2015). Zambrano, Seward & Sayo (2017) defines blockchain as a public decentralized 
database, and adds that some blockchain projects’ code are open source software (OSS), which is 
what associates the two concepts. Johnson (2012) continues to explain the concept OSS as computer 
software that is developed by different contributors in collaboration with each other. Similarly, Shah 
(2006) explains OSS as software that can be used, modified and redistributed by contributors. 
Furthermore, OSS communities rely upon the voluntary collaborative actions of thousands of 
contributors (Shah 2006). There are prominent examples on blockchain projects that are OSS, such as 
the two largest, Bitcoin and Ethereum, which are both peer-to-peer networks. As of today, Ethereum 
is the second most valuable blockchain project with a market capitalization of -$67B. The contributors 
of Ethereum constitutes a large community, which makes the platform dependent on the collaborative 
actions from the OSS community (Kiffer et al. 2017; CoinMarketCap 2018; Chakrabarti & Chaudhuri 
2017; Swan 2017; Zambrano et al. 2017; McPhee & Ljutic 2017; Kogure, Kamakura, Shima & Kubo 
2017). Due to the magnitude of certain projects, structure and governance becomes a necessity in 
order to orchestrate and coordinate an entire virtual community towards the same goal. The 
contributors within blockchain communities may have diversified views, although the common values 
of the community unite them (Reijers, O’Brolcháin & Haynes 2016). Furthermore, the governance, 
organization and coordination of the communities are believed to be critical for success in projects 
(Von Hippel 2001; O’Mahony & Ferraro 2007).  
Sadowski, Sadowski-Rasters and Duysters (2008) state that governance mechanisms are used to 
manage the contributors, coordinate the development and launch new releases within projects. 
Governance is important because an essential feature of peer-production communities is that they rely 
on volunteering contributors (De Filippi & Loveluck 2016). However, some project founders believe 
that if they implement a governance structure, they would lose control over the direction in which the 
project is heading. Others believe that formalizing the structure of an OSS project may hinder its 
growth (Ritvo, Hessekiel & Bavitz 2017). The formalization of governance would thereby be seen as 
something that makes the project less attractive to contribute to (Ritvo et al. 2017). This is according 
to Ritvo et al. (2017), the consequence of an inappropriate governance model, and not because of 
formalization, when it comes to governance. Therefore, Ritvo et al. (2017) believe that it is important 
to have a governance model that encourages the volunteers to contribute to the OSS projects, as does 
Shah (2006), who also state that the governance structures affect the motives of the contributors. 
Governance has been a tool for withholding control, supervision and monitoring, whereas the overall 
motivation is to merge together the different objectives within the collective (Sadowski et al. 2008). 
OSS communities are governed with different variations of control and openness. Some projects have 
directed roles to individuals, whilst others let the contributors act freely (Markus 2007). There is a 
belief that we lack knowledge of how governance mechanisms are combined within OSS 
communities, and there are many unanswered questions within OSS governance research (De Noni, 
Ganzaroli & Orsi 2013; Markus 2007). However, there are no reasons for future work to be 
independent from past foundations. Therefore, this study presumes that OSS theories might offer 
insight into blockchain OSS communities. There might be governance mechanisms that are aligned 
with OSS projects, and there might be some that differ. This assumption is based on the fact that 
blockchain projects are often OSS, and thereby might inherit governance mechanisms from OSS 
communities (Chakrabarti & Chaudhuri 2017; Zambrano et al. 2017). 
In 2016, 80% of research within the blockchain research field was aimed towards Bitcoin, whereas a 
majority was on technical subjects (Yli-Huumo et al. 2016). A large amount of research has been 
focused on the technicalities and on the legal aspects of blockchain technology. As the user base 
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grows, areas such as management of blockchain platforms need to be researched (Lindman, Rossi & 
Tuunainen 2017). This study aims to bring insight to the governance aspects. The purpose of the study 
is to enhance and contribute to the research field on governance within public blockchain OSS 
communities. Public in the sense that the blockchain platform can be accessed by any individual (Xu 
et al. 2017). Furthermore, this study aims to identify which governance mechanisms are expressed 
within the Ethereum blockchain community and has similarities with OSS communities. The expected 
contribution is an extended and renewed appearance of governance mechanisms for blockchain-
related OSS communities. Therefore, the following research question is set to direct this study. 
Which governance mechanisms are expressed within public blockchain communities? 
To answer this question, the study is structured as follows. A theoretical description of the concepts 
‘blockchain technology and governance’, and ‘OSS and governance’ is presented to make sense of the 
findings and to enrich the reader with necessary knowledge of the concepts. Next, a theoretical 
framework is presented and works as a lens for the empirical data. The methodology is presented and 
explained in the section referred to as research methodology. Together the three categories; research 
context, data collection and analytical method aims to thoroughly provide insight on how the study 
was conducted. The result consists of empirical data and is systematically presented in the same order 
as the theoretical framework. Lastly, the discussion and analysis of the result and findings is presented 
together with limitations and implication for further research. 
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Theory 
The theory is intended to give a fundamental basic understanding on the concepts of blockchain 
technology, OSS and how governance is expressed respectively to the two subjects. Both phenomena 
are defined and explained beneath their related headings. The association between blockchain 
technology and OSS is defined through development collaboration within open source communities 
and blockchain technology (Chakrabarti & Chaudhuri 2017; Kiffer et al. 2017; Kogure et al. 2017; 
McPhee & Ljutic 2017; Swan 2017; Zambrano et al. 2017). 
 
Blockchain and governance 
Murck (2017) presents five basic characteristics to blockchain technology. Firstly, it is a distributed 
database, which means that the database and its history are accessible to everyone. Therefore, it is not 
just one person who controls the data. The second principle of blockchain technology is the peer-to-
peer transmission, which means that communication does not go through a central node, rather it is 
direct between two parties. Murck (2017) continues to present his third principle, transparency with 
pseudonymity which means that each and every transaction is visible to anyone who has access to the 
system. The fourth principle is irreversibility of record, which hinders anyone altering the data in the 
database. Therefore, all changes within the database are recorded and stored permanently and cannot 
be erased or tampered with (Engelhardt 2017; Murck 2017). The fifth and last characteristic is the 
computational logic, which means that the logics can be programmed through algorithms, so that 
specific actions are triggered between actors when this logic falls in place. Blockchain projects are 
often based on OSS, which refers to software developed in collaboration by diverse contributors. For 
example, Bitcoin, introduced in 2008, started off being developed as open source, and shortly 
thereafter depended on the global OSS community of contributors (Teigland, Yetis & Larsson 2013; 
Nakamoto 2008; Zambrano et al. 2017; McPhee & Ljutic 2017). For the early enthusiasts of 
blockchain, the political polarization of the innovation was what motivated them, considering that 
they were inclined towards radical decentralization (Lindman 2017). Furthermore, blockchain can be 
compared to the effect of electricity to telecommunication, television and the Internet, considering the 
massive scale of sub-inventions that the technology is believed to instigate (McPhee & Ljutic 2017). 
Nofer, Gomber, Hinz and Schiereck (2017) state that blockchain technology can be used in different 
industries. For example, the financial industry can make use of the technology by creating innovations 
such as cryptocurrencies, where value can be exchanged using cryptography for secure transactions 
(Nofer et al. 2017). It can also be used for decentralized proof of existence of documents and 
decentralized storage, where timestamps and signatures can be secured without the need of a third 
party. The technology is revolutionary but yet still uncharted, and there is much more to learn (Nofer 
et al 2017). This is due to many innovations based on blockchain technology still being in the genesis 
phase. As with the innovations continuously being improved and requiring updates, there are two 
different ways of doing it, involving changes in the protocol. This involves performing forks, which 
can be seen as a roll out procedure for protocol changes (Kiffer et al. 2017). One procedure is termed 
soft fork, which means that the update is backwards compatible. If it is not backward compatible, it is 
termed hard fork (Kiffer et al. 2017). Blockchain based systems rely on planned forks to roll out 
changes in a decentralized manner. If a community does not reach consensus regarding updates to the 
protocol, a separation in the network occurs. This leads to two differentiated systems, each with its 
own path and contributors (Kiffer et al. 2017; Arruñada & Garicano 2018). It could also be described 
as two different versions running in parallel due to clashing opinions within the developer team 
(Nyman 2015). Studies have shown that a majority of the virtual communities often adapt to the 
newer version of the fork (Kiffer et al. 2017). 
The governance aspect of blockchain technology can be tricky, in fact, everyone could be seen as 
being in charge since governance is dependent on consensus within the community. There is no need 
for one individual to be in charge, since algorithms determine consensus (Zambrano et al. 2017). The 
communities are based on groups of people who wants to achieve a collective outcome, by voting in a 
decentralized manner (Zambrano et al. 2017). Furthermore, this also means that the community 
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contributors are voluntarily active, and the trust is decentralized and depersonalized. However, this 
does not indicate enhanced governance (Zambrano et al. 2017). The largest blockchain platform 
communities are open, which means that contributors join if they accept the conditions and are free to 
leave whenever they want (Kiffer et al. 2017; Zambrano et al. 2017). Besides working towards 
common goals, governance structures are set up within these communities in order to maintain power 
relations, and keep some degree of social order, all while ensuring legitimacy of the actions taken by 
the community (De Filippi & Loveluck 2016). There are two decisive features that are forming the 
governance structure of these communities, particularly the fact that they are self-organized and 
volunteer-driven (De Filippi & Loveluck 2016). Since the development of OSS relies on the 
contributions of developers, the governance structure has to be in line with the collective interests and 
goals. The development of entire platforms, projects or modules are dependent on the interests of the 
contributors (Nyman 2015). In contrast to previous developments within OSS projects, the interest 
from industries, companies and individuals cultivated more rapidly for Bitcoin and Ethereum 
(Lindman 2017). Furthermore, one of the motives for this is because the contributors within 
blockchain communities understood that they needed to incentivize and acquire support from the 
cryptocurrency space in order to grow and obtain benefits (Lindman 2017). 
Summarizing blockchain from a governance perspective, the vision is to protect the networks from 
political pressure, so that it relies upon a decentralized infrastructure which cannot be controlled by 
one or a few individuals. The governance is instead encoded with protocols and processes within the 
original architecture. While taking part of the community, the original rules are accepted by the 
contributor. As the network grows, reaching consensus becomes more challenging, which is 
intentional. If consensus is not reached, the network splits and take different paths. This leads to a 
new protocol and a new community (Murck 2017). There is still a lot more to learn about blockchain 
technology; what we do know is that both Bitcoin and Ethereum still operate and are regarded as OSS 
(De Filippi & Loveluck 2016; Chakrabarti & Chaudhuri 2017; Zambrano et al. 2017; Kiffer et al. 
2017). 
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Open source software and governance 
OSS is an approach where contributors come together to create software on a global basis (Scacchi, 
Feller, Fitzgerald, Hissam & Lakhani 2006). A developer with an interest in contributing to the 
community can join without any geographical limitations (Von Hippel 2001). Thus, the organizational 
model for development and innovation is referred to as community-based innovation (Shah 2006). 
Von Hippel (2001) explains OSS as a community which is run completely by and for users, and 
argues that such community projects can lead to great innovations. Furthermore, OSS is often 
associated with high-quality and popular software, whereas it involves organized production by 
contributors (Johnson 2012). Nyman (2015) discloses two different types of OSS projects. The first 
one is when the community is serving as the leader and driver of the project. This means that the 
community itself diversifies the control and governance among the individuals within it, whereas 
sometimes the community decides to include a non-profit foundation to chart the project. In contrast 
there is also the project in which the owner and driver is the corporation. The corporate project is 
where the corporation is the driving force, and retrieves supporting action from the OSS community 
and the corporate community. Often, the corporate community is composed of several companies that 
benefits from the development of software (Nyman 2015). 
As there are different types of OSS projects, they are all governed in some way, thus the definition of 
OSS governance has been defined differently. Markus (2007) argues that it is up to the researcher to 
decide what OSS governance means, thereby making it challenging for individuals to assess the 
research. Markus (2007) adapts the definition by Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2001) to fit within an OSS 
context, thereby defining OSS governance as follows: “the means of achieving the direction, control, 
and coordination of wholly or partially autonomous individuals and organizations on behalf of an 
OSS development project to which they jointly contribute” (Lynn et al. 2001, p. 6). The definition by 
Markus (2007) is adopted and used in this study. 
Within OSS, the model differs from proprietary models, because it does not rely upon rights or 
hierarchical control (Shah 2006). In contrast, the model is based on collaborative and voluntary efforts 
of the community (Shah 2006). De Filippi and Loveluck (2016) state that there are two features that 
are decisive in online peer-production communities, such as being self-organized and volunteer-
driven. Within the academic field, the view of why people contribute to OSS differs. Some believe 
that it is the ideology of free software that drives the OSS development (Shah 2006), whereas others 
believe that it is defined by satisfying the contributor’s own needs (Franke & Von Hippel 2003; Kuan 
2001; Lakhani & Von Hippel 2003; Shah 2006). There are obviously different beliefs on why people 
contribute to OSS: whereas some contributors do it for fun, others for personal development, technical 
curiosity or success and intellectual challenge. However, the majority enjoy programming and have a 
desire to be a part of a community (Matei & Irimia 2014). 
O’Mahony and Ferraro (2007) address the most significant problems within organizational research as 
to how communities coordinate, govern and organize the actions of individuals in order to achieve 
outcomes from the collective. The purpose of governance within OSS can be distinguished by three 
main positions, exhibited differently by the literature according to Markus (2007). One position is that 
OSS governance solves a dilemma regarding incentives. When individuals or organizations want to 
join a project, the incentives have to be clarified. The second position that Markus (2007) presents is 
that the coordination issues are easier to solve when there is a governance structure in place within the 
OSS. Lastly, the governance mechanisms hold a motivational potential, which could later determine if 
the contributor decides to join the project (Markus 2007). De Noni et al. (2013) believes that creating 
a good foundation for a OSS project depends on the quantity and the combination of resources. The 
argument is that competence of the people attracted to the project is critical for the innovation process 
(De Noni et al. 2013). Trust is another critical factor when dealing with the coordination of online 
efforts, and which the online socio-technical systems address through informal relations, technical 
solutions and formal rules (De Filippi & Loveluck 2016). De Noni et al. (2013) state that the 
governance mechanisms are used in order to create attractiveness and sustainability of the community. 
Furthermore, OSS is a collective process of knowledge creation (De Noni et al. 2013). All OSS 
projects have some kind of hierarchy, either by coordination or by rising as a natural outcome (De 
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Laat 2007). Anthes (2016) state that many successful OSS projects, such as Apache and Eclipse has 
distinct ownership and governance structure.  
In summary, governance within OSS projects takes different forms. As mentioned earlier, the OSS 
projects depend upon voluntary contributions from individuals, whereas the community needs to be 
organized. By adapting a governance structure, a community has the means to support the direction, 
control and coordination in which the individuals jointly contribute to (Markus 2007; De Noni et al. 
2013; O’Mahony 2007). To maintain control over relations, keep the social order and work towards 
the community’s common goal, a governance structure is necessary (De Filippi & Loveluck 2016). 
This is to ensure legitimacy of the collective actions (De Filippi & Loveluck 2016). Through an array 
of certain governance tools, the OSS community will achieve an overall design of the governance 
structure, whereas in all projects some kind of hierarchy is inevitable (De Laat 2007).  
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Theoretical framework 
De Laat (2007) has studied OSS with the focal areas being on three different types of governance, 
which are referred to as spontaneous governance, internal governance and governance towards outside 
parties. The mechanisms introduced by De Laat (2007) are widely recognized within OSS research. 
By introducing previous research on OSS, this study aims to gather insight into the governance that 
portrays blockchain OSS, which the chosen theory facilitates by providing a ground from previous 
research in a related field. When aggregating categories for governance mechanisms within OSS 
projects, De Laat’s (2007) study of internal governance had a large amount of leverage and 
recognition from other researchers, whereas the corresponding authors that are aligned with the 
different categories are presented in the framework below. Furthermore, based upon the scholarly 
orientation of this study, the internal governance theory by De Laat (2007) was suitable as a 
framework for this study. De Laat (2007) believes that by combining the different governance 
mechanisms, the OSS community will assume an overall design. It was acknowledged that the 
research literature of OSS governance used in this study’s framework is relatively old, due to the fact 
that the field of research has been mature for a while. De Laat’s (2007) mechanisms presented in the 
study are grouped into the following six categories: modularization, division of roles, delegation of 
decision-making, training and indoctrination, formalization and autocracy/democracy. These 
mechanisms contribute to better understanding the phenomena of internal governance within OSS. 
The tools also help to coordinate efficiency and effectiveness within large communities (De Noni et 
al. 2013). Due to the large number of corresponding authors in the framework presented in the right 
row of the figure below, it is safe to assume that it is a common conception of governance 
mechanisms within OSS. As a result from an extensive search of previous research, the mechanisms 
presented by De Laat (2007) are well-fitted for this study. Furthermore, following De Laat’s (2007) 
categories, this study uses them as a framework for identifying governance mechanisms within 
blockchain communities. 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical framework (own compilation). 
The first mechanism presented by De Laat (2007) is ‘modularization’, which addresses the issue of 
large amounts of participants. When projects grow larger and the number of participants increases, the 
projects are often divided into several modules. This way, a project that consists of several modules 
can be worked on simultaneously and be coordinated, which means that many different modules can 
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coexist (De Laat 2007). Markus (2007) includes the process of dividing individuals into different parts 
of the project into a category called community management, whereas O’Mahony and Ferraro (2007) 
refer to it as a community form. An example of a project resulted from modular development is the 
well-recognized OSS project, Apache (Mockus, Fielding & Herbsleb 2002). 
‘Division of roles’ is the second governance mechanism presented by De Laat (2007). Within 
projects, the individuals are either assigned a role or they invent new ones. For example, some 
individuals can access certain files related to the project, whereas others cannot. The observer may 
participate in discussions and have access to documentation and files, while the developer develops 
source code, and the project owner manages the project (De Laat 2007). Mockus et al. (2002) express 
the importance of dividing roles, and describe it as roles and responsibilities. However, in order to be 
effective within work processes, Markus (2007) believes that the community needs to be managed. 
Therefore, it is significantly important to divide roles when it comes to software development 
processes. Jørgensen (2001), O’Mahony and Ferraro (2007) agree that distribution of roles in projects 
is critical. For a project to be effective, it should have clearly defined roles and instructions (Ritvo et 
al. 2017). There are clearly a lot of differentiated roles, but what matter is that they are divided (De 
Laat 2007). 
In all projects, decisions need to be taken regarding new activities, new methods to be used or other 
community-related issues. However, the most important decision within OSS has to do with code 
acceptance. This refers to ‘Delegation of decision-making’ and is De Laat’s (2007) third mechanism. 
Who decides if certain code snippets are to be implemented within the experimental version or within 
the real version? In a centralized steered community, the project leader is in charge of decisions (De 
Laat 2007). Nakakoji, Yamamoto, Nishinaka, Kishida and Ye (2002) expresses that the influence of 
the project leader is important when taking decisions, due to the project leader being a decision-maker 
and responsible for the overall direction of the project.  In a decentralized community it is up to the 
contributors, whereas a decision is often taken by voting (Nakakoji et al. 2002). This could mean that 
developers try the code in a personal copy of the source code, having it reviewed by peers, whilst in 
others, developers implement the change and have it reviewed on forums (De Laat 2007). Markus 
(2007) believes that all projects have someone who is chartering it, whether it is an elected individual 
or someone who voluntarily stepped up to take the lead. However, even if there either is a group of 
people or one person in charge, the creations of an OSS community are a collective process of 
knowledge creation. 
In earlier years of OSS projects there were no conditions to participate in a project: everyone who was 
interested was welcome to join the project in some way. In later years, the communities grew larger 
and the division of roles were imposed, thereby initiating conditions on joining a project. This is how 
De Laat’s (2007) fourth mechanism, ‘training and indoctrination’, comes into play. Since OSS 
communities grew larger, the contributors often had to prove their identity, e.g. through having 
cryptographic keys signed. They also had to demonstrate their technical skills, similar to an exam (De 
Laat 2007). De Laat (2007) mentions examples of times when individuals who wanted to become 
developers had to complete different stages of tasks to in order to apply for entry into a project. 
Markus (2007) state the importance of finding the right competence for specific projects, and refers to 
this as a part of community management.  
OSS projects can be global, which means that there are no geographical limitations for the 
contributors within a certain project. While handling global projects, ‘formalization’ is called for, 
which is referred to as De Laat’s (2007) fifth mechanism. In order to weave together contributors that 
are distributed across the globe, formal procedures and tools have to be forged. These tools have to 
enable contributors to discuss, ease the procedure of bug reporting and keep track of versions that has 
been taking place (De Laat 2007). Both Markus (2007) and Mockus et al. (2002) argue for the 
importance of having and using the right information and tools. This makes communication a key 
concept in OSS projects (Jørgensen 2001). Formalization becomes critical when people in the same 
project are located in different places around the world, since all the people involved need to be on the 
same page (Shaikh & Cornford 2003; Yamauchi, Yokozawa, Shinohara & Ishida 2000; Foss, 
Frederiksen & Rullani 2016).  
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Within OSS communities the appointment of a leader could be performed in different ways. The two 
main categories are ‘autocracy’ and ‘democracy’, which is also De Laat’s (2007) final mechanism. If 
the leadership was self-appointed or the inventor stayed on as the leader, it is best described as being 
an autocracy. An example of this is Linus Torvalds, the founder of Linux (De Laat 2007). However, if 
the community chooses the leader or a core team with the use of an electoral process, is a democratic 
choice. For example, some projects have project leaders elected by the contributors of the project (De 
Laat 2007). An example of this is the Debian project, where the project leader is annually elected by 
the contributors (De Laat 2007). Ritvo et al. (2017) argues that the leaders of a project should be set 
by the community and that authority should be decentralized.   
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Research methodology 
To be able to answer the research question “Which governance mechanisms are expressed within 
public blockchain communities?”, a trace ethnography study was conducted. The methodology trace 
ethnography allows for gathering substance of data and reconstruct patterns. This type of 
methodology fits well with the scope of this study and has shown to previously being successful 
within technology and science studies (Geiger & Ribes 2011; Beaulieu 2010). Trace ethnography was 
chosen on the grounds of it involving the exploitation of documents or traces within technological 
systems in socio-technical environments. The methodology is used to collect data during a historical 
event, and to gather records of activities that have left a mark on the use of online information systems 
(Howison, Wiggins & Crowston 2011). Evidence of actions committed on online forums leaves 
digital traces. This type of evidence is best summarized by three characteristics. Firstly, the data is not 
produced, it is found. This means that the data is a consequence of certain activities rather than 
produced specifically for a research purpose. Secondly, the data is based on events. Because of the 
data not being produced in the present, the data has to be interpreted by the researchers, rather than for 
example, having respondents interpret their own interactions and summarize it. Thirdly, the data is 
longitudinal, meaning that the data has been produced over a long period of time. This makes it 
necessary to combine data in order for it to have meaning (Howison et al. 2011). Since the chosen 
event has already happened and the data has been produced as a by-product, the methodology is well-
fitted for analyzing discussions during the specific timeline. It also leaves room for the researchers to 
interpret a structure from the produced data. Furthermore, the collection of data and analysis is based 
on governance mechanisms that De Laat (2007) has compiled and introduced to OSS communities. 
Based on De Laat’s (2007) governance mechanisms, a table of criteria was created to study how the 
mechanisms would fit within blockchain communities. Previous research that have the same 
conclusions as De Laat (2007) were identified and found to have strengthened the relevance of the 
mechanisms. By combining previous research on OSS governance, it is possible to capture the 
literature and generate a theoretical framework that could potentially give insight to the subject of 
OSS governance in blockchain communities. In addition, an exploratory approach was combined with 
the methodology, in order to identify additional governance mechanisms. This was done to leave 
room for unexpected findings and to keep an open mind on new findings which could serve as a basis 
for future theories (Shields & Rangarajan 2013).  
 
Research context 
In the initial phases of deciding a research context of this study, the hard fork that resulted in 
Ethereum and Ethereum Classic matched with the methodology of a trace ethnography study. A 
timeline that spans from June to August 2016, was chosen. Due to the event being controversial 
within the Ethereum community, a large amount of digital traces is left around the online 
communities, thereby fitting with the research methodology (Howison et al. 2011). The hard fork was 
used as an opportunity to identify and analyze how governance mechanisms are expressed during a 
change in the Ethereum community. It was expected that the hard fork would lead to discussions that 
are not everyday problems regarding development and therefore result in discussions that would not 
emerge otherwise.  
Ethereum is a blockchain platform based on OSS, which is intended to provide a protocol for building 
decentralized applications. Vitalik Buterin, the founder and a main contributor of Ethereum, wrote a 
white paper on Ethereum, explicitly communicating the ambitions of the project, where the emphasis 
of the platform is fast development time and high security (Kiffer et al. 2017). Ethereum did this by 
building a blockchain with a programming language, allowing individuals to create smart contracts 
and applications with their own rules. The platform was announced to the public in the early part of 
2014. By then, the platform had already attracted many stakeholders. Two years later, a specific set of 
contracts was developed, which was intended to work as a capital fund and a crowdfunding approach 
within the crypto space. This was referred to as the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO). 
Because of the DAO being decentralized, it reduced the costs and let the individual investors have 
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more control. However, after the release, the DAO was exploited, in which a hacker withdrew funds 
without the balance being updated. By exploiting it, the hacker got a hold of $50m worth of Ether, 
which is the currency used on the platform. During this time, many proposals were discussed within 
the community. One of the proposed measures was to perform a hard fork which would let the 
investors get their funds back. However, this involved a major change in the protocol, which lead to 
two different blockchains. The decision raised significant controversy, as the community were put to a 
vote through a website called carbonvote.com. This meant that depending on how much Ether an 
individual held in their wallet, the more the vote would count. The outcome of the voting clearly 
showed that the community wanted to perform a hard fork, which took place July 20, 2016, and 
resulted in two different paths for the Ethereum community. The supporters and non-supporters of the 
hard fork went in different directions. Ethereum Classic continued as the original protocol with a 
minor part of the previous community, and Ethereum went on as the new protocol, with a much larger 
support of the community, one being Vitalik Buterin. The final outcome were two different paths of 
the community, re-appropriation of the lost funds to investors and a large amount of discussions on 
the online communities. The timeline below illustrates the notable events prior, during, and after the 
hard fork in mid-2016. 
 
Figure 2. Timeline (own compilation). 
 
Data collection 
Before collecting data, predetermined criteria needed to be set to ensure gathering of relevant data. 
The screening and collecting of empirical data was delimited to what was appropriate in regard to the 
predetermined criteria. To reconstruct and summarize the description from the theoretical framework 
into statements that were used as predetermined criteria for the collection of the empirical data, a 
thematic analysis of the theoretical framework was made. This analysis resulted in a framework that 
deliberately eased the collection process. Based on the analysis of the description, criteria were 
introduced to ensure quality of the empirical data. The description of the governance mechanisms is 
based upon De Laat (2007) and corresponding authors (see figure 1). Furthermore, in order to gather 
data that would provide grounds for analytical work, the empirical data needed to comply with the 
predetermined criteria. The predetermined criteria for each of the governance mechanisms are 
described in the figure below (see figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Predetermined criteria for the data collection (own compilation). 
The data consists of digital trace data such as forum and blog posts from different online sources, 
where contributors of the Ethereum OSS projects communicates. The empirical data was restricted to 
being posted on certain dates, strictly ranging from June 1 to August 31, 2016, which is one month 
ahead and one month after the hard fork, thereby constituting a historical event (Howison et al. 2011). 
The posts that were within the limited time frame, had a relevant tag or title and matched the 
predetermined criteria (see figure 3) were collected for analysis. Two Microsoft Excel spreadsheet 
was created in order to store the data from forums and blogs. The data was then categorized into seven 
various categories, which corresponded to the governance mechanisms. Collected data was initially 
gathered in two separate spreadsheets, one for each researcher. In the cells of the spreadsheets, data 
was inserted and structured in the same way for all columns. Each cell consisted of information 
regarding date of writing, author, URL, source, motivation for its relevance and a summarizing 
meaning of the post. It was organized this way so that it would be easy to return to a specific post, if 
needed. In the cases where the post could not be evaluated as relevant from the title, the content and 
discussions were evaluated. As the posts on the different online sources combined contains a lot of 
data, the saturated amount of fifteen posts per researcher, well-fitted for each category were set as a 
target, with the exception for the category referred to as ‘exploratory outcome’. The ‘exploratory 
outcome’ category was the seventh and last column and included data that was not an immediate fit 
for the six categories, but was still considered of interest for the study, thereby being related to the 
research field of governance. This was since the ‘exploratory outcome’ category constituted an 
exploratory approach, aimed to provide new insights and grounds for further research. Furthermore, 
the target of fifteen posts was exceeded on certain categories, as a larger amount was expected to 
further strengthen the conclusion. However, it was believed that new insights would not appear 
simply by gathering and analyzing a larger amount of posts. The reliability of the data is deemed to be 
high because of it being natural appearing data, and a by-product of communications between 
contributors. This approach excludes respondents from interpreting and summarizing their own 
responses, and allows the researchers to interpret the found data into evidence (Howison et al. 2011). 
Data was found on the websites Ethereum Blog, Ethereum Forum, Ethereum Stack Exchange, GitHub 
and Reddit (see figure 4). The sources were seen as the main channels by examining the official blog 
and from following the contributors, thereby the sources contained a large amount of activity.  
The five different websites were the sole sources for the empirical data. Figure 4 presents and 
describes the five sources. The first source is the Ethereum Blog, where empirical data was collected 
by limiting searches to a desired time frame. The second source was the Ethereum Forum, which had 
categories simplifying the search. The categories ‘general project discussion’, ‘mining’, ‘jobs and 
skills’, ‘education’, ‘all categories’ and ‘projects’ were scanned briefly, because of the substantial 
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amount of posts. Remaining categories on the website were not directly related to the study and were 
therefore disregarded. Furthermore, the third source of empirical data was collected from Ethereum 
Stack Exchange. Empirical data was found by altering the URL to a specific page, which would 
include posts from the desired date. The fourth source for the data collection was GitHub. An 
advanced search was conducted on the GitHub platform, whereas the dates were restricted to desired 
time interval. In addition, the search word restriction was used and delimited to Ethereum-related 
posts. The fifth source for the empirical data was Reddit. Data was found through filters and by using 
a search engine that was specifically delimited to forum posts on Reddit. The searches were made 
within the subreddits ‘ethereum’, ‘ethdev’ and ‘EtherMining’, which were found by searching on 
Ethereum in their search function. By applying the necessary filters on the website and real-time 
analytics platform: redditsearch.io, the relevant posts were listed.  
 
Figure 4. Sources and description. (own compilation) 
 
Analytical method 
A thematic analysis of the data was performed in five steps in order to interpret and make sense of the 
data. The figure below presents the analytical steps from the data collection where data was 
determined as relevant or irrelevant to the final analysis (see figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Step-by-step analytical method (own compilation). 
As the first step in the analysis, each researcher collected data that was determined to fit the 
predetermined criteria (see figure 3) in separate spreadsheets. The spreadsheets consisted of the five 
sources on the y-axis, and corresponding governance mechanisms on the x-axis. The data was 
gathered and directly categorized into the corresponding columns, associating the post with a specific 
governance mechanism and source. It was organized this was in order to smoothly merge the 
documents in a later stage. Each researcher found approximately fifteen corresponding governance 
mechanisms for each category that fit with the predetermined criteria by making immediate 
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judgement calls, and because of the large amount of data circulating the web platforms, once a post 
was scanned, it was either determined as relevant or irrelevant. Each time a forum or blog post was 
analyzed, it was counted, which helped keep track on how many posts the researchers together had 
analyzed. The last category, referred to as ‘exploratory outcome’ did not have any predetermined 
criteria and was not limited to a certain number of posts in order to collect unexpected findings. Step 
two of the analysis; after the researchers gathered and analyzed posts separately, the researchers 
swapped spreadsheets. This was in order to cross-check and maintain accuracy and ensure reliability, 
as the initial collection of posts could be subjected to misconception (Miles & Huberman 1994). 
Therefore, the researchers discussed the relevance and misconceptions of the collected posts. The 
third step of the analysis was revisions of the spreadsheets. This was due to personal involvement 
which can result in data being perceived differently and may also alter the way in which the data is 
encoded (Miles & Huberman 1994). To further assure the quality of the posts, the data that was 
determined to be relevant was stored until it was determined irrelevant by both researchers, and 
thereafter disregarded. In the fourth step, the spreadsheets were compiled into one final spreadsheet. 
The jointly relevant data was structured and organized in a systematic way, allowing for the data to be 
analyzed one last time. The collected data was organized into different colors depending on the source 
of the data. Posts from Reddit were red, GitHub were yellow, Ethereum Blog were purple, Ethereum 
Forum were green, and Ethereum Stack Exchange were blue. This made it easy to view where the 
data was collected from, which was used to construct a summarizing table of the final data sources 
(see figure 6). The fifth and final step was the final analysis. By together analyzing each and every 
collected post again, examples for the result section were decided. This analysis also resulted in an 
emerging pattern that showed how respective governance mechanisms was expressed. 
The results illustrated in the result section is a fraction of the pattern that emerged, and aims to give 
the reader a general picture of the collected data. A total of 938 posts were analyzed, whereas 134 
posts were determined to be relevant to the study, and 804 did not meet the criteria for the final data 
collection. Figure 6 illustrates the amount of data that was compiled into the final spreadsheet. 
 
Figure 6. Showing number of collected and analyzed sources of the final spreadsheet (own compilation). 
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Result 
In this section, results from the collected data are presented. During the gathering of empirical data, 
predetermined criteria were used as a guideline of which data should be collected. Only a small part of 
the gathered data is presented in this section, as the aim is to provide the main meaning of the 
empirical data. The findings are presented systematically in the same order as the theoretical 
framework. Each citation is an extraction from diverse posts of the five sources; Ethereum blog, 
Ethereum Forum, Ethereum Stack Exchange, GitHub, and Reddit. Prior to the quotes, the examples 
are explained. 
 
Modularization 
On the Ethereum Blog, a contributor of the Ethereum community posts an update of the progress on 
different projects. The blog post was made on July 8, 2016, and described the progress of C++ 
development. In the post, it is apparent that different actors are working on a set of differentiated tasks 
on the Ethereum platform. The contributors that are mentioned in the post below are working with 
coding projects on different parts of the platform. 
“Apart from the features side, Bob has been working on a proposed process for re-licensing of the 
C++ runtime client code to Apache 2.0. [...] Dimitry Khoklov and others added some new RPC 
endpoints to the eth client which allow much more flexibility for testing smart contracts. [...] Greg 
Colvin spent the last months speeding up the C++ implementation of the EVM interpreter.” - 
Ethereum Blog, July 8, 2016 
As the community consists of many contributors, the individuals work on different parts of the 
platform. Therefore, the modules are worked on by various individuals simultaneously. A blog post 
provides an update of which projects are progressing forward within the Ethereum development 
ecosystem. The following citation includes information on updates to different projects, which 
provides a status report addressed to the community. 
“Ethereum wallet has been refined significantly over the last several months expanding support to 
arbitrary contract interaction via the “custom contracts” tab. [...] After all the hard work spent 
reorganizing the C++ codebase, the CPP team has shifted gears from Mix to Remix, as the IDE now 
targets the web. Remix has hit it first alpha, and published with a demo online. [...] Nick Johnson has 
started work on the Ethereum Name Service.” - Ethereum Blog, July 11, 2016 
In addition to the progress of the projects, the example below provides an update on a project that is 
about to merge with the main repository. One tranche of the development will be connected to the 
main development. This means that one module of development code has to be integrated with the 
main code, clearly showing the use of modularization. 
“Something to watch closely is light-client functionality entering public testing phase. Zsolt has been 
working on this code for months and the team looks poised to merge it into the main repo soon.” - 
Ethereum Blog, July 11, 2016 
 
Division of roles 
The division of roles was apparent on GitHub, whereas code-related discussions take place. A 
community member started a thread on July 7, 2016 and asked a specific contributor for help with his 
project of developing infrastructure as code. By doing this, the post is exemplifying that roles are 
being divided within the community. 
“I have been working on an infrastructure-as-code alternative to these tedious per-distro sets of 
instructions. [...] Please could help me out and copy [...] locally and run it, does it go into the right 
conditional?” - GitHub, July 7, 2016 
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As shown below, the member agreed to support the fellow community member, thereby inheriting an 
assigned role. A response to the request just one day after the initial post was posted, where an 
assigned contributor communicated that the issue is being addressed. 
“I'm justing working on it. I was based on old script, but I'll adjust to the new one.” - GitHub, July 8, 
2016 
Another thread on GitHub addressed issues that needed immediate attention by the community. The 
owner of the thread went through the code of the specific project and realized there was significant 
work to be done, and started a task list. The task list was used to organize the contributors into 
different roles, addressing a diversified set of tasks that needed to be settled within the project. 
“I went through the code and it's pretty bare [...] So there's a lot of work to do. I'm starting this as a 
task list so we can organize what we're working on.” - GitHub, July 30, 2016 
As a response to the task list, many contributors of the community wanted to provide their support 
with the necessary tasks, and explained in the thread what they were interested in contributing with. 
The citation below shows that the contributors are dividing themselves into roles within a project. The 
first citation relates to the graphical interface part of the project, whereas the three following posts 
relate to other technicalities of the coding project. The final post shows an example of a contributor 
wanting to support with other parts of the project, asking what need that they can help with. 
“I’m in, i’ll start digging around and see what I can work out UX/UI side.” - GitHub, August 2, 2016 
“If it helps, I'm happy to build javascript wrappers [...]” - GitHub, August 3, 2016 
“I will prepare a D3.js chart moduel [...]” - GitHub, August 3, 2016 
“I'm going to crunch some CSS now, improving the desktop size and hopefully making a accessible 
mobile site. Stay tuned!” - GitHub, August 5, 2016 
“[...] now that it is the weekend I can lend a hand either front or backend. What prominent need can I 
help with?” - GitHub, August 5, 2016 
 
Delegation of decision-making 
The third mechanism, delegation of decision-making, was shown on both the Ethereum Blog platform 
and on GitHub. Firstly, when the Ethereum community stood before a choice, whether to fork or not 
to fork, the community was called upon to take a vote. A blog post creator communicated that the 
community needed to vote on the issue of forking to solve a major issue involving reclaiming lost 
funds from investors. The post also clarifies which tools should be used and when the votes will be 
counted. From the voting, a majority decision would take place, involving changes in the protocol, or 
to leave the protocol as it is.  
“The Hard Fork is a delicate topic and the way we see it, no decision is the right one. As this is not a 
decision that can be made by the foundation or any other single entity, we again turn towards the 
community to assess its wishes in order to provide the most appropriate protocol change. [...] The 
community tool carbonvote will be used to set the default fork option for Geth. At block number 
1894000 the votes will be tallied, and the outcome will determine whether the default is set to fork or 
not to fork.” - Ethereum Blog, July 15, 2016 
In contrast to a community-wide issue, there are also decisions taken on a project level. As the 
community together compose different projects and modules, the contributors often work on different 
issues. The project owners often have an idea of how to solve an issue, and need contributors to 
support the coding development of the project. In the following case, the poster of the thread takes a 
deciding role regarding what way the project should be headed, and seeks support from the 
community. The thread owner clearly takes the deciding role in this case, by stating what is needed 
for the project to move forward. 
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“What I need: 
- Feedback on each section by the appropriate leads. Unassign yourself when done. 
- To fill out the contribute section [...] 
- To write up a quote about multiformats 
- To collect press for the last month 
Then I think we should be good to go.” - GitHub, August 25, 2016 
There are also projects where code and implementation decisions are based on discussions in the 
forum, where one individual acts as the project leader, but still offers options for the contributors to 
vote in a decentralized manner. An example from GitHub is shown below where the writer of the post 
presents two options. From here, the community now needs to take a decision on which option should 
be taken. The writer of the blog post mediated recommendations, and urges the contributors to share 
their thoughts. 
“Currently there is a web3.eth.sign method [...], Option 1 [...] Option 2 [...] To reconcile the current 
lack of a general purpose data signing method, I recommend we either endorse a new method or 
change the old.” - GitHub, July 8, 2016. 
The community responds to the post and a discussion regarding what is best is started. One 
contributor agrees with a previous reply, but still has concerns. The final decision within a project 
might not always be defined by a voting process, however, this example shows that discussions are 
encouraged in order to make a rational decision over the project’s future. 
“Yes, a decrypt function would be doable I think. But you would still need to define a corresponding 
encrypt function outside of web3, and make sure you can extract the public key in order for people to 
encrypt to you. It's a tricky problem design wise for sure [...].” - GitHub, July 26, 2016 
 
Training and indoctrination 
As a result from the split that occurred due to the hard fork on July 20, 2016, the community searched 
for new contributors. In the citation below, the community used GitHub to call for individuals to 
demonstrate their skills. The community then examined what they could contribute to the project. If 
the contributors did not have certain understanding and skill-level that the community are looking for, 
they may be considered as a potential harm to the project instead of an asset. 
“Please post here if you would like to gain membership to the ethereumproject organization [...] 
Please introduce yourself, tell us your skillset and how you can contribute to the project. We will try 
to remain open as possible but everyone will needed to be added on a trial basis to prevent potential 
abuse.” - GitHub, July 25, 2016 
Responding to the previous post, a contributor expressed their excitement to be a part of the project 
and demonstrated skills in the hope of being able to join and support the community. Below, the 
contributors presented and demonstrates which coding languages and frameworks they are proficient 
in, and present previous experience within blockchain development. 
“I am very excited to try to help out this project [...]  
I am a web developer, full stack capable but shine on the backend.  
Languages: Ruby/PHP/JS (Node)  
Frameworks: Rails/Laravel  
Extra: Experience tinkering with custom blockchain deployment using Multichain, also wrote a 
simple block explorer on said custom chain.” - GitHub, July 26, 2016 
One day after the contributor’s response to the initial post, the thread creator replies to the contributor 
that the individual seems to be qualified for different projects. This example is taken from a three-day 
conversation between two contributors, which exemplifies the pace of the discussions within the 
community. 
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“Thank you for volunteering your time to the project, your experience seems like you could fit in 
different projects.” - GitHub, July 27, 2016 
The following two examples show that additional individuals are interested in contributing. They 
presented their skills, with the hope that they would be paired with projects that would fit their area of 
expertise. The first contributor has experience in open source community organization, and state that 
they can contribute with documentation. Afterwards, the second contributor expresses that he has 
coding expertise, and presents what language he is proficient in. Additionally, that he wants to learn 
by working in a small project to start with. 
“I can contribute to technical documentation. I'm experienced in open source community 
organization and currently transitioning to a more project management capacity focused on ICONIX 
and applying that to solidity/web3 development [...]. So I will volunteer to be the grammar and 
spelling editor with a rare code edit here and there, usually within a comment even then.” - GitHub, 
July 27, 2016 
“Hi: 
I am Keylor, I can invest my weekend in doing something for community,I use Java, Language is not a 
problem,but I am new to BlockChain, maybe I can learn more in practice, especially in dong small 
project works. [...]” - GitHub, August 23, 2016 
Lastly, contributors that are already part of a project sometimes call for help in order to attract 
contributors with specific expertise. For example, a merited individual within the community is 
looking for someone with specific technical skills, adding that he could help with providing an 
overview of the current code.  
“Greetings, everyone! 
Bob Summerwill, Developer on cpp-ethereum here. 
If you have anybody who wants to maintain a Classic fork of that codebase, please do let me know, 
and we can coordinate on the branching, Appveyor/TravisCI automation - I can give an overview of 
the code, etc. [...].” - GitHub, July 23, 2016 
 
Formalization 
There are several different forums in which the community communicates, which may be seen as 
formalized communication tools. For example, GitHub, Ethereum Blog and Reddit are shown in the 
following quotes. The citation that follows illustrates an event in which a new contributor was invited 
to join the community, and an existing member on GitHub suggested to move the repository to the 
community’s organization in order to make it easier to collaborate. The member also explained that 
there are formalized ways on how to maintain history on commits. 
“It may be wise to discuss the possibility of moving that repository to this organization to make 
collaboration easier. [...] Doing it in this way also maintains all the commit history so every author is 
properly credited for their work.” - GitHub, July 27, 2016 
As can be seen on the Ethereum Blog, credited contributors regularly release posts regarding security 
flaws, technical updates, recommendations and other thoughts. In the citation below, there is a post 
describing the Ethereum Virtual Machine, adding information about the characteristics of it. Next, a 
post has been made about the security flaws that the Ethereum account has, alerting that a problem is 
not yet fixed. Lastly, a recommendation on how to use the wallets for storing funds securely. This 
exemplifies information that affects the whole community, therefore needs to reach the community 
through the formalized communication channels. 
“In this post I’m going to explain some of the differences between the two implementations and 
describe some of the characteristics of the JIT EVM and why it can be so much faster than the byte-
code EVM.” - Ethereum Blog, June 2, 2016 
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“Security Alert – cpp-ethereum’s account unlocking problem not yet fixed” - Ethereum Blog, June 3, 
2016 
“Do not use wallet contracts or owner accounts of those wallets that were created by the Ethereum 
Wallet 0.4.0 or earlier. If you send to (or interact with) a malicious contract it could take ownership 
of your wallet contract. Create a new wallet and move your funds.” - Ethereum Blog, June 24, 2016 
The Reddit forum constitutes different genres of discussions; it has a subreddit function letting 
individuals subscribe on the information regarding certain subjects. Consequently, within a subreddit, 
one community individual presents implications of entering the so-called ‘proof of stake’, which aims 
to achieve consensus. The individual also calls for discussions regarding the future of the community, 
in which the individual underlines the importance of discussion to further progress Ethereum. This, 
once again, illustrates that communication occurs in a formalized way on several different channels. 
“I have no inclination to support one side over another; however, if Vitalik and the Casper team think 
their solution is a proper one, I am absolutely open to the idea of implementing a new consensus 
mechanism - the community is the reason I have supported, and will continue to support, this 
project.” - Reddit, August 6, 2016 
 
Autocracy/democracy 
On Reddit, the founder of Ethereum presented his thoughts of forks and on the future of the 
community. Prior to when the post was made, the community had split into different directions, 
resulting from the hard fork. Subsequently, the founder of Ethereum was happy to see that the two 
branches went in different directions after the fork, and expresses his thoughts on future community 
disputes. 
“If in the future there is that kind of a dispute in Ethereum, I’d definitely be quite happy to see 
Ethereum A go in one direction and Ethereum B go the other.” - Reddit, July 26, 2016 
The founder then continues to clarify that these are just their personal beliefs and thoughts, and 
continues to question if this was the correct approach.  
“[...] But those were just my beliefs and intermediate values. How do we know that this "let a hundred 
flowers bloom" position is actually correct?” - Reddit, July 26, 2016 
Furthermore, Buterin continues to share his thought on the matter of hard forks, as shown in the 
citation below. The founder does not believe in hard forks as a long-term means to resolve theft. 
However, six days prior to the post, a hard fork within the Ethereum community was performed, due 
to it being a majority vote. 
“I may as well offer my own views on hard forking. I do not believe that using hard forks as a primary 
paradigm to resolve thefts or to deal with unethical applications is a long-term viable strategy.” - 
Reddit, July 26, 2016 
The forum post by the Ethereum founder was well received by the active community. Community 
members responded by commenting the forum post on Reddit. Below are five quotes from posts that 
responds to the founder; the majority of the posts praised the founder and thanked him for posting and 
sharing his thoughts. These responses were posted the same day as the initial post was posted.  
“Vitalik always finds the right things to say. Can't upvote enough” - Reddit, July 26, 2016 
“I highly appreciate your calm and honest posts” - Reddit, July 26, 2016 
“Fascinating, thanks as always for your thoughts.” - Reddit, July 26, 2016 
“Thanks u/vbuterin you always bring calmness to the messed up situations the community finds itself 
in.” - Reddit, July 26, 2016 
“Great post, and a reminder why ETH is in such good hands” - Reddit, July 26, 2016 
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Another community member responded to the previous post that Ethereum is not supposed to be 
centralized, with an embedded meaning that Ethereum should be in the hands of the community, and 
not in Buterin’s. It is apparent that the post is intended to make contributors understand that the 
community is decentralized. 
 “Not centralized, not centralized, not centralized!” - Reddit, July 26, 2016 
In a different subject, one writer on the Ethereum Blog addressed the issues of developing smart 
contracts stating that it took more effort than what was anticipated. The DAO hack occurred due to a 
security flaw in a set of contracts, therefore leading to the hard fork. The post state that reaching 
consensus was more time consuming than they anticipated it would be. 
“The last week was quite hectic for all of us in the Ethereum ecosystem. The DAO has shown us that it 
takes much more effort to write smart contracts than we originally anticipated; but also that it takes a 
surprising amount of debate to reach a consensus on issues of this scale.” - Ethereum blog, June 24, 
2016 
Furthermore, before the hard fork, the writer confirms that everybody in the community had a voice 
regarding how the issue of the hack should be fixed; it is apparent that the community is engaged in 
decisions. 
“Everybody in our community was very vocal and forthcoming about how the problem should be fixed 
in his/her opinion, or whether there’s even a problem to fix in the first place.” - Ethereum blog, June 
24, 2016 
A contrasting opinion was expressed by another community member who does not believe that the 
vote on the hard fork was correctly communicated to the community. The member was disappointed 
that the main contributors did not engage the entire community in the voting, stating that a vote that 
nobody knows about is not a vote. 
“Apparently there is voting happening right now. I visit r/ethereum/ several times a day and I didn't 
even realize that it was happening right now. Whatever the results of this vote may be, they mean 
nothing if there was no widespread announcement of the vote beforehand.” - Reddit, July 9, 2016 
 
Exploratory outcome 
This category is for the empirical data that did not fit any predetermined criteria but is still of interest 
to this study. The findings are related to governance and constitutes an interesting insight, by 
instigating that the community and the development is driven by initiatives from the contributors. The 
examples are findings from patterns that were discovered. For example, one community member had 
an interesting suggestion that seemed to be encouraged throughout the community. In case the 
contributors did not find any suitable project for their ambitions, they have the possibility to create 
their own project within the community, as shown in the citation below. 
“As a reminder to everyone interested, you don't have to just work within the existing projects, you 
can find other relevant projects to maintain or even start new ones.” - GitHub, July 27, 2016 
In a different thread, it is shown that community members actually take their own initiative. After the 
DAO hack, community members proposed ways that would hinder theft in various ways. The 
following post is a proposal that would give the contributors some time to address the hack, however, 
it would not return the compromised Ether to the investors. The thread on GitHub was ultimately an 
alternative of a decision to pursue the problematics of the DAO that would have to be made by the 
community. If the implementation would have been pursued, the balance at the time of 
implementation of the DAO could have been protected. 
“The strategy works in such a way that when a user enables mining -- either thru --mine or the RPC -
- it will start to go in a sort of failsafe mode where it will start to ignore transactions and blocks that 
reduce the DAO's balance.” - GitHub, June 18, 2016 
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As the same topic continues on Reddit, a well-known contributor of the community state that the 
changes would not return the Ethers to the DAO or the previous token holders. It would rather allow 
for the community to get breathing room to discuss the next steps. However, this is a good example of 
how the community works together, supporting each other’s initiatives. 
“To clarify, this PR only prevents ethers being withdraw and allows us (the community) with some 
breathing room to come up with the next steps. This does not, and certainly isn't intended to, to return 
the ethers to the DAO or the token holders.” - Reddit, June 18, 2016 
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Discussion 
In order to answer the research question, empirical data generated on prominent sources of discussion 
within the Ethereum ecosystem was gathered and analyzed. As previously mentioned, this provided 
the study with untampered data that was produced and communicated at the time of the event. 
Thereby, the empirical data is believed to provide a foundation for the mapping of governance 
mechanisms within blockchain OSS communities. Preceding literature indicates that there are 
similarities between governance mechanisms within OSS projects and blockchain OSS projects, 
which provided a foundation for this study. Data presented in the result section imply that blockchain 
OSS governance has inherited mechanisms from OSS governance. In addition to these inherited 
similarities, differences and uncharted perspectives were addressed, which was motivated by the 
exploratory approach of the study. From the empirical data, De Laat’s (2007) first five governance 
mechanisms are applicable and inherited into the blockchain OSS. In contrast, the sixth mechanism is 
differently defined than what De Laat (2007) suggests. The exploratory approach allows the study to 
extend or map other potential mechanisms, where one eminent finding is especially interesting to 
discuss, referred to as ‘initiative-based progress’ and is presented as the seventh governance 
mechanism. Moreover, additional observations related to the study are presented. 
 
From OSS governance to blockchain OSS governance 
In this section, the governance mechanisms referred to as modularization, division of roles, delegation 
of decision making, training and indoctrination, and formalization are addressed. Several similarities 
were found between OSS governance and blockchain OSS governance. Presented in the result section, 
the empirical data was dependent on being aligned with the predetermined criteria, which were set to 
map blockchain OSS governance mechanisms. As for modularization, some modules were presented 
through a post on the Ethereum Blog by a community member, which clearly showed that the 
Ethereum community works modular with interoperable projects. Moreover, the community works in 
a modular fashion with both technical and non-technical projects. A large-scale project such as 
Ethereum seems to require contributors to work separately in order to progressively develop the 
platform. Another reflection on why it is important to work in a modular fashion is because of the 
constant progress of other platforms. There seems to be excessive pressure on contributors to 
continuously develop the platform towards the desired state. Within the modules, it was apparent that 
there is a distinct division of roles. In the result section, examples on the division of roles are 
illustrated. In some cases, a project owner assigns a specific contributor to an issue. In other cases, 
contributors assign themselves to different roles and tasks. This demonstrates that it is not always 
someone who delegates the community into different roles; sometimes the community divides 
themselves on the basis of their own knowledge. Contributors assigning themselves to certain tasks 
seems to be a recurrent theme within the Ethereum community. One of many factors for Ethereum’s 
successful progress of development may be because of contributors eager to be involved. Moreover, 
the mechanism that involves delegation of decision-making is not as apparent as the previous two 
mechanisms. Depending on the issue, they are delegated differently. For example, forks may involve 
the entire community by bringing them to a vote, whereas smaller projects often have their project 
owner making the final decision. Presented in the result section, an example is provided by a 
community member that wants to get feedback and opinions from the community. The community 
member gave the contributors the power to vote on which of the two provided suggestions were to be 
pursued and encouraged them to decide which alternative they would like to be implemented. 
Contributors gave their thoughts on the issue, although it was up to the project owner to decide. 
Therefore, it can be argued that it is a mixture between a centralized community and a decentralized 
community in the matter of decision making. Out of the empirical data, smaller projects are often 
centralized when it comes to decision-making, with a designated project owner taking the final 
decisions. Issues related to mainstream development is however decentralized and needs to reach 
consensus within the community. The governance mechanism referred to as training and 
indoctrination shows how community members actively go out and seek contributors that has desired 
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skills for projects. The example involves contributors responding to a call for developers in order to 
present their skills with the hope of being matched with a project. Reflecting on the number of 
contributors that are willing to provide support to project, there is little doubt that the community is 
unified and appears to have incentives on progressing the platform. Additionally, after the Ethereum 
hard fork, the formalized tools underwent a change. It appears to be understood that the use of 
formalized tools within the diverse communities were divided after the hard fork, bringing one 
community to certain formalized communication channels and the other community to other channels. 
Moreover, the communities divided rapidly, since they are not any longer contributing to the same 
protocol and have contrasting views and goals for the future. However, contributors found a way to go 
back and review previously written code if needed. It is apparent that the community uses specific 
formalized tools to communicate within their community. While analyzing the empirical data, it was 
found that specific communication channels were used for different purposes. For example, the 
Ethereum Blog was used as a platform where the main contributors communicate thoughts and 
information that involves the community. In contrast, GitHub was mainly used for coding-related 
purposes, and Reddit for discussion and informing-related purposes. 
 
A discrepancy in leadership 
Deciding whether the Ethereum ecosystem has an autocratic leader or not is difficult. This refers to 
De Laat’s (2007) sixth and last governance mechanism called autocracy/democracy. Vitalik Buterin, 
the founder and the informal leader of Ethereum has a large amount of influence, however is not seen 
as the leader, as the community and its authority is decentralized. Within Linux, Torvalds is the 
autocratic leader, deciding everything regarding mainstream development (De Laat 2007). This does 
not apply to all OSS projects, but may rather be the governance structure of smaller projects. Debian, 
however, chooses its project leader annually by voting within the community (De Laat 2007). In 
contrast from these examples, Buterin does not fit in as either one. It could be argued that because 
substantial changes related to mainstream development boil down to a democratic vote, the 
community as a whole is its common leader. It could also be argued that by making the weight of the 
votes dependent upon how many Ethers you hold in your wallet, it is not truly democratic, although it 
wishes to be perceived that way. The voting process used in the hard fork in July 2016 is referred to as 
‘coin voting’. By assuming that a majority of Ether is being held by Buterin, co-founders and a subset 
of contributors, the reality is that what they vote for may actually be the inevitable outcome, in the 
form of a majority vote. By gathering data during the hard fork, digital traces show that the voting did 
not reach out enough to the community; some contributors didn’t even know there was a vote. This 
would question whether the voting was truly democratic. Arguably, this does not define a community-
based consensus. However, what is important to understand is that just because a majority vote leans 
towards a certain suggestion, it does not hinder the minority vote from going through with their own 
vision and form their own community, with an old or new version of the blockchain protocol. 
Therefore, the contrast between OSS projects and blockchain OSS projects is inherently different. 
Even though an OSS project finds itself in a democratic vote, it is often not feasible for the minority 
vote to continue with their own version of the project. Forks do seem to be a progressive approach by 
eliminating differentiated opinions and providing a solution that lets the contributors continue with 
their own visions. However, the forking of projects may not always be the best solution, since the 
consensus of the community as a whole might be a more desirable outcome. Reaching consensus and 
keeping the community pleased is arguably the best way to keep contributors incentivized. 
Furthermore, Buterin has a lot of influence on the development of the Ethereum platform. 
Nonetheless, the empirical data suggests that the community largely respects Buterin and willingly 
follows his suggestions on development. When there are major concerns related to development, 
Buterin provides the community with potential solutions and thoughts. He also sometimes asks the 
community for advice. The study did not gather any data on how Buterin got his influence, preventing 
the study from confirming how the informal leader got to this position. Buterin’s thoughts and 
concerns have a large amount of impact, but he does not own Ethereum and he does not decide the 
road of mainstream development, as long as a majority of the community follows the actual version of 
the protocol that they believe will prevail.  
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A seventh governance mechanism: initiative-based progress 
This section refers to the findings from the category named ‘exploratory outcome’. By including an 
explorative approach, the researchers’ expectations were that at least one additional finding would be 
found and lead to further research. In addition to the reflections of the autocracy/democracy section 
prior to this, a seventh governance mechanism aims to introduce the suggestion that the Ethereum 
community is driven by initiative-based progress. This could be seen as an extension of the sixth 
governance mechanism or as an independent, seventh mechanism, which is excluded from the 
theoretical framework and compiled solely by the researchers to attempt to identify new findings. 
Moreover, the leadership has more of an informal nature. The direction is not defined by purely 
autocratic or democratic decisions, but rather by the initiatives of contributors, which could be 
referred to as the decentralized community. It is apparent that the environment in which blockchain 
projects find themselves in is highly competitive and rapidly progressing. The perspective that this 
study aims to present is that the seventh governance mechanism, initiative-based progress, is what 
drives the continuous progress of the platform. All the contributors have the freedom to start new 
projects, contribute to existing ones, or participate in mainstream development, which is seemingly a 
stimulating approach. Contributors are highly engaged in the vision of the platform and have the 
possibility to engage the community in different ways. This seems to all be dependent on the 
philosophy of initiating projects yourself. It also encourages the contributors to take their own 
initiatives. This approach can be seen as self-powered by the community, as it seems that as more 
projects are being developed, more people connect, contribute and make the project’s community 
grow. To put it into perspective with OSS projects, this approach does not rely on the decisions of an 
autocratic leader or democratic votes, but is rather self-steered making it possible for all contributors 
to do their own thing. This coheres with De Filippi and Loveluck’s (2016) statement about decisive 
features in peer-production communities, being self-organized and volunteer-driven. Even though 
Buterin, the founder, has a large amount of power and influence over decisions regarding the protocol, 
the decentralized community is composed of many visionary contributors regularly questioning how 
the platform should work. The approach of initiative-based progress is arguably a more flexible and 
progressive governance mechanism, resulting from radical decentralization, which so far is spurring 
innovation.  
 
Limitations and implications for further research 
This study contributes to governance literature within blockchain OSS communities by introducing 
which governance mechanisms are used. The similarities between OSS communities and blockchain 
OSS communities are identified through the use of a theoretical framework from previous OSS 
literature. In addition, a seventh governance mechanism was identified, based on an extended 
perspective of the sixth governance mechanism. This seventh governance mechanism is intended to 
provoke further research.  
A limitation of this study is that the study is based on a methodology that is highly effective in 
examining digital traces, but may be weak when holistically examining systems and users. This may 
be argued to be because records on platforms can be seen as incomplete, and therefore make it 
difficult to observe. A suggestion would be to combine another approach of methodology, in order to 
further strengthen the research as the trace ethnography is interpreted solely by the researchers. A 
prior expectation of the study was to find differences in governance during the phases of the hard 
fork, e.g. before, during, and after the hard fork. This was decided later to not be included, because of 
the level of detail the study would have instigated. Another limitation of this study is that the research 
focuses on one blockchain platform, Ethereum. Additional blockchain projects may be researched in 
order to further strengthen the theory presented.  
The implications from this study resulted in the introduction of five governance mechanisms that are 
similar to those within OSS literature. Those governance mechanisms provide introductory 
understanding of how governance within blockchain OSS communities takes place. Generating 
knowledge of governance within blockchain OSS was the essential intention when researching this 
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subject. Given the noticeable difference of autocracy/democracy, a foundation for added knowledge 
of the differences will further strengthen and cultivate the field of research. Additionally, initiative-
based progress is intended to be further researched as it is an incomplete suggestion of theory. Further 
studies may also include investigating how the blockchain platforms are affected by the monetary 
environment. This could be an interesting approach to also combine with the governance aspect and 
how the communities are steered. 
 
 
  
26 
 
Conclusion 
This study intends to identify which governance mechanisms are expressed within blockchain OSS 
communities. In order to answer this, a trace ethnography methodology was used, whereas data was 
gathered from sources in which the contributors within the OSS community communicates. The 
methodology in combination with the theoretical framework allowed the study to draw relations 
between OSS communities and blockchain OSS communities. Five of the governance mechanisms 
used in OSS communities were identified within the blockchain OSS community, having its roots in 
OSS theory. However, the sixth governance mechanism differed within the researched community, 
due to leadership being difficult to define since the blockchain community is decentralized. The 
concluding remarks points towards the community as a whole steering the development direction. 
There is an informal leader, mainly due to the respect he has from the community, however, he is not 
seen as the actor deciding the direction of mainstream development. In addition, initiative-based 
progress is presented as an extension of the initial governance mechanisms. This governance 
mechanism may be the driver of projects, as the community’s common efforts, decentralized 
governance and opinions provide a progressive and flexible path of development within the 
blockchain OSS community. 
 
 
  
27 
 
References 
Anthes, G. (2016). Open source software no longer optional. Communications of the ACM, 59(8), pp. 
15-17. 
Arruñada, B. & Garicano, L. (2018). Blockchain: The birth of decentralized governance. Economics 
Working Paper Series No. 1608, pp. 1-38. 
Beaulieu, A. (2010). Research Note: From co-location to co-presence: Shifts in the use of 
ethnography for the study of knowledge. Social Studies of Science, 40(3), pp. 453-470. 
Böhme, R., Christin, N., Edelman, B. & Moore, T.  (2015). Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and 
Governance. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(2), pp. 213-238. 
Chakrabarti, A. & Chaudhuri, A. K. (2017). Blockchain and its Scope in Retail. International 
Research Journal of Engineering and Technology, 4(7), pp. 3053-3056. 
CoinMarketCap (2018). Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization. 
https://coinmarketcap.com/ [2018-04-30]. 
De Filippi, P. & Loveluck, B. (2016). The invisible politics of bitcoin: governance crisis of a 
decentralised infrastructure. Internet Policy Review, 5(3), pp. 1-28. 
De Laat, P. B. (2007). Governance of open source software: state of the art. Journal of Management 
& Governance, 11(2), pp. 165-177. 
De Noni, I., Ganzaroli, A. & Orsi, L. (2013). The evolution of OSS governance: a dimensional 
comparative analysis. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 29(3), pp. 247-263. 
Engelhardt, M. A. (2017). Hitching Healthcare to the Chain: An Introduction to Blockchain 
Technology in the Healthcare Sector. Technology Innovation Management Review, 7(10), pp. 22-
34. 
Ethereum Blog (2018). Promoting a free, decentralized and open future. https://blog.ethereum.org/ 
[2018-05-18]. 
Ethereum Forum (2018). Ethereum Community Forum. https://forum.ethereum.org/ 
[2018-05-18]. 
Ethereum Stack Exchange (2018). Ethereum Stack Exchange. https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/ 
[2018-05-18]. 
Foss, N. J., Frederiksen, L., & Rullani, F. (2016). Problem-formulation and problem-solving in self-
organized communities: How modes of communication shape project behaviors in the free open-
source software community. Strategic management journal, 37(13), pp. 2589-2610. 
Geiger, S. R. & Ribes, D. (2011). Trace ethnography: Following coordination through documentary 
practices. System Sciences (HICSS), 44th Hawaii International Conference, pp. 1-10. 
German, D. M. (2003). The GNOME project: a case study of open source, global software 
development. Software Process: Improvement and Practice, 8(4), pp. 201-215. 
Github (2018). The world’s leading software development platform. https://github.com/ [2018-05-18]. 
Howison, J., Wiggins, A. & Crowston, K. (2011). Validity issues in the use of social network analysis 
with digital trace data. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 12(12), pp. 767-797. 
Johnson, J. (2012). Open Source Software. The Oxford Handbook of the Digital Economy, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 1-29. 
Jørgensen, N. (2001). Putting it all in the trunk. Incremental software development in the FreeBSD 
open source project. Information Systems Journal, 11(4), pp. 1-19. 
Kiffer, L., Levin, D. & Mislove, A. (2017). Stick a fork in it: Analyzing the Ethereum network 
partition. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks, pp. 94-100. 
28 
 
Kogure, J., Kamakura, K., Shima, T. & Kubo, T. (2017). Blockchain Technology for Next Generation 
ICT. Fujitsu Scientific & Technical Journal, 53(5), pp. 56-61. 
Lindman, J. (2017). Open Source Software Research and Blockchain. Report from Dagstuhl Seminar 
17132, pp. 114–116. 
Lindman, J., Rossi, M. & Tuunainen, V. K. (2017). Opportunities and risks of Blockchain 
Technologies in payments- a research agenda. In Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences, pp. 1-10. 
Lynn Jr, L. E., Heinrich, C. J., & Hill, C. J. (2001). Improving governance: A new logic for empirical 
research. Georgetown University Press. 
Markus, M. L. (2007). The governance of free/open source software projects: monolithic, 
multidimensional, or configurational? Journal of Management & Governance, 11(2), pp. 151-163. 
Matei, A. & Irimia, S. I. (2014). Open Source Governance - A More Ambitious Cousin of 
Collaborative Governance. International Journal of Public Administration, 37(12), pp. 812-823.  
McPhee, C. & Ljutic, A. (2017). Blockchain. Technology Innovation Management Review, 7(10), pp. 
3-5. 
Miles, M. B. & Huberman, M. A. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook. 
Beverly Hills. Sage publications. 
Mockus, A., Fielding, R. & Herbsleb, J. (2002). Two case studies of open source software 
development: Apache and Mozilla. ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology, 
11(3), pp. 309-346. 
Murck, P. (2017). Who Controls the Blockchain? Harvard Business Review. 
https://hbr.org/2017/04/who-controls-the-blockchain [2018-03-25]. 
Nakakoji, K., Yamamoto, Y., Nishinaka, Y., Kishida, K., & Ye, Y. (2002). Evolution patterns of 
open-source software systems and communities. In Proceedings of the international workshop on 
Principles of software evolution, pp. 76-85. 
Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. 
Nofer, M., Gomber, P., Hinz, O. & Schiereck, D. (2017). Blockchain. Business & Information 
Systems Engineering, 59(3), pp. 183-187. 
Nyman, L. (2015). Understanding Code Forking in Open Source Software. Diss. Hanken School of 
Economics Information Systems Science, Department of Management and Organisation. 
O’Mahony, S. (2007). The governance of open source initiatives: what does it mean to be community 
managed? Journal of Management & Governance, 11(2), pp. 139-150. 
O’Mahony, S. & Ferraro, F. (2007). The emergence of governance in an open source community. 
Academy of Management Journal, 50(5), pp. 1079-1106. 
Porru, S., Pinna, A., Marchesi, M. & Tonelli, R. (2017). Blockchain- oriented Software Engineering: 
Challenges and New Directions. In Proceedings of the 39th International Conference on Software 
Engineering Companion, pp. 169-171. 
Reddit (2018). reddit: the front page of the internet. https://www.reddit.com/ [2018-05-18]. 
Reijers, W., O'Brolcháin, F. & Haynes, P. (2016). Governance in Blockchain Technologies & Social 
Contract Theories. Ledger, 1, pp. 134-151. 
Ritvo, D. T., Hessekiel, K. & Bavitz, C. T. (2017). Challenges & Opportunities Concerning Corporate 
Formation, Nonprofit Status, & Governance for Open Source Projects. Cyberlaw Clinic, Berkman 
Klein Center for Internet & Society Research Publication, pp. 1-39. 
29 
 
Sadowski, B. M., Sadowski-Rasters, G. & Duysters, G. (2008). Transition of governance in a mature 
open software source community: Evidence from the Debian case. Information Economics and 
Policy, 20(4), pp. 323-332. 
Scacchi, W., Feller, J., Fitzgerald, B., Hissam, S. & Lakhani, K. (2006). Understanding free/open 
source software development processes. Software Processes Improvement and Practice, 11(2), pp. 
95-105. 
Shah, S. K. (2006). Motivation, governance, and the viability of hybrid forms in open source Software 
development. Management Science, 52(7), pp. 1000-1014. 
Shaikh, M. & Cornford, T. (2003). Version management tools: CVS to BK in the Linux kernel.  In 
3rd Workshop on Open Source Software Engineering, pp. 127-132. 
Shields, P. & Rangarajan, N. (2013). A playbook for research methods: Integrating conceptual 
frameworks and project management. Stillwater: New Forums Press. 
Swan, M. (2017). Anticipating the Economic Benefits of Blockchain. Technology Innovation 
Management Review, 7(10), pp. 6-13.  
Teigland, R., Yetis, Z., & Larsson, T. (2013). Breaking out of the bank in Europe-exploring collective 
emergent institutional entrepreneurship through bitcoin. SSRN Electronic Journal, pp. 1-27. 
10.2139/ssrn.2263707. 
Von Hippel, E. (2001). Innovation by user communities: Learning from open-source software. MIT 
Sloan management review, 42(4), pp. 82. 
Von Krogh, G., Spaeth, S. & Lakhani, K. (2003). Community, joining, and specialization in open 
source software innovation: a case study. Research Policy, 32(7), pp. 1217-1241. 
Yamauchi, Y., Yokozawa, M., Shinohara, T. & Ishida, T. (2000). Collaboration with Lean Media: 
how open-source software succeeds. In Proceedings of the 2000 ACM Conference on Computer 
supported cooperative work, pp. 329-338. 
Xu, X., Pautasso, C., Zhu, L., Gramoli, V., Ponomarev, A., Tran, A. B. & Chen, S. (2016). The 
blockchain as a software connector. In Software Architecture (WICSA), 2016 13th Working 
IEEE/IFIP Conference, pp. 182-191. 
Yli-Huumo, J., Ko, D., Choi, S., Park, S. & Smolander, K. (2016). Where is current research on 
blockchain technology? —a systematic review. PloS one, 11(10), pp. 1-27. 
Zambrano, R., Seward, R. K. & Sayo, P. (2017). Unpacking the disruptive potential of blockchain 
technology for human development. International Development Research Centre, pp. 1-84. 
 
